Abstract: How do states make citizens? The question is as old as states themselves. Surprisingly, however, the approaches to answering it have emerged as a form of parallel play, uncoordinated (and poorly understood) across fields. This essay attempts to reconcile disparate realms of social research that address the question. The first, curriculum theory, grows out of educational research that for a century has focused almost exclusively on schools, schooling, and intentional settings for academic knowledge transmission. The second realm draws primarily on research from psychology, sociology, and political science to look empirically for effects of exposure to particular kinds of social phenomena. These include, but are not exclusive to, public institutions and policies. This essay begins by developing a mainstream conception of curriculum theory. It then compares and contrasts social science traditions that engage questions related to the state's role in civic identity formation. Finally, it offers a case study on New York City's controversial policing strategy known as Stop, Question, and Frisk, exploring how curriculum theory (developed in the context of mass schooling) can be a useful framework for understanding the educational features of a distinct social policy.
Introduction
In his 1918 teaching textbook, The Curriculum, American educationist Franklin Bobbitt demarcated an ambitious new field of study. «Recently we have observed that there is a theory of curriculum-formation that is no less extensive and involved than that of method», he wrote. Despite recent attention to institutional reform (replacing one-room schools with graded ones) and much attention to pedagogical reforms in teaching practices, the public school still hewed to an archaic curriculum. What schools taught had no theory, Bobbitt lamented. And it desperately needed one if the school was to sufficiently meliorate the socio-political revolution of industrial capitalism. «New duties lie before us», he warned. «And these require new methods, new materials, new vision» (Bobbitt, 1918, pp. iv-v) .
Cómo referenciar este artículo / How to reference this article Justice, B. (2017 Such demands for new vision amid social crisis were not new to educational reformers and political philosophers, but Bobbit's efforts to systematically examine the contents of a child's curriculum reflected the progressive-era obsession with social policy as the means to ensure social progress. They also reflected a new movement among educational theorists in particular to more carefully distinguish what was taught in schools from how teachers taught it. In the former case, the emerging field of curriculum theory rejected longstanding 19 th century notions of transference and mental discipline that justified the traditional content of schooling. Instead reformers sought to develop links between social theory and curricular design. John Dewey, for example, sought to renew American democracy through changing classroom social and epistemic relations. Bobbitt emphasized social efficiency: fitting each child into its place in the emerging industrial-democratic order. Other reformers offered alternative theories (Schubert, 2002; Kliebard, 2002, pp. 3-4; Tanner & Tanner, 1990) . Nevertheless, still a generation away from the New Deal and the emergence of the modern welfare state, Bobbit's curriculum theory, with all the others, rested squarely and almost wholly on the public school as the incubator of American industrial-democracy.
Today the curriculum has acquired a rich body of theory far beyond Bobbitt's vision. The unbridled optimism of progressive-era visions has given way to more realistic and critical views of the role of mass schooling and its curriculum in American society: the reproduction of anti-democratic traditions as well as democratic ones, racism, sexism, colonialism, militarism, and inequality, as well as civic competency. Curriculum theory now differentiates among several forms of curriculum, chief among them the overt (what is explicitly taught), the implicit or even «hidden» curriculum (what is taught in the daily grind of experiencing school, intentionally or not), and the null curriculum (what of significance is overlooked or excluded). The sociopolitical underpinnings of curriculum theory, which were once dominated by a binary between the functionalism of social efficiency on the one hand, and democratically-oriented theories espoused by Dewey and William Kilpatrick (with others) on the other hand, have given way to a flowering of analytic lenses (Reese, 2005; Reynolds & Webber, 2004; Flinders & Thornton, 2017) . Similarly, scholars today engage in a rich field of theory and research in the meaning of civic education from multiple perspectives, including, for example, civic idiocy versus other-regarding (Parker, 2002) , political frames of mind (authoritarian, closed vs. liberal, open) (Kahne & Middaugh, 2006; Westheimer, 2006) , normative philosophies of good citizenship (Levine & Higgens-D'Alessandro, 2010) , political socialization theories, perceptions of legitimate relational status to groups and authority figures (Tyler & Jackson, 2013; Tyler, 2011) , or as the result of social capital accumulation and deployment (Putnam, 2000) , among others (Sherrod, Torney-Purta, & Flanagan, 2010a) .
In one critical aspect, however, the notion of curriculum has not kept pace with the changing nature of American society and schools within it. While scholars of curriculum aspire to make connections between what goes on inside schools and the world outside of them, they still place schools at the center of curriculum study to the near-complete exclusion of other public institutions. Perhaps the preoccupation with schooling as the exclusive site of curriculum theory made sense in the early 20 th century, when public schools were, institutionally speaking, the only game in town. In the early 21 st century, however, schools now exist within a vast network of public institutions, policies, and laws that together constitute a complex and unevenly distributed ecology of civic experience and training. Schools join prisons, police, welfare agencies, family services, public transportation, housing and health care providers, municipal courts, and the military, among other institutions, as sites of systematic learning that provide a coherent and powerful set of experiences about a person's relation to the state. Insofar as such institutions are educative, they have a curriculum. Social policy is curriculum work.
It's important to distinguish a notion of social policy as curriculum work and «public pedagogy», a protean concept that has been used by scholars in recent years to describe multiple social processes from multiple disciplinary perspectives. In their comprehensive review of public pedagogy literature, Sandlin, O'Malley, and Burdick (2011) find two primary uses of the concept: critical cultural analysis and identity transmission (with an eye toward hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses), and descriptions of extra-school educational institutions that attempt to instruct the public in formal knowledge. While the former conception is beyond the ambit of this essay, the latter is useful because it generally includes a variety of institutions that have their own pedagogies and curricula, such as public libraries, museums, parks, and monuments. Although he did not use the term «public pedagogy», Lawrence Cremin attempted such a broad institutional definition in his seminal three volume history of American education (Cremin, 1970 (Cremin, , 1988a (Cremin, , 1988b . What Cremin did not account for, however, was the growth of the welfare state and the myriad ways in which liberal educational institutions existed in a much larger ecology of policies and institutions. While some uses of the notion of public pedagogy are helpful to understanding how the welfare state shapes citizens, the use of the word «curriculum» here proposes a way of seeing that is more structured than cultural studies and more expansive than extra-school institutions designed to amuse and educate the public as consumers.
What does it mean to theorize the civic curriculum of public education (as opposed to public schooling) in the modern welfare state? And what does such theorizing achieve? In the remainder of this essay I will explore what a curriculum theory of the welfare state might look like. I begin by developing a relatively mainstream notion of curriculum theory as a framework for analysis, with particular emphasis on civic development. I then examine recent work in several social science fields that examines the role of social policy, law, and institutions in civic development. While such concepts are akin to curriculum theory, they differ in their units of analysis, focus (outputs rather than inputs) and sensitivity to the multiple valences of overt, implicit, and erased meaning that institutions, laws, and social policies project. Finally I use New York City's infamous «stop, question, and frisk» policy, to explore what deploying curriculum theory might look like outside a school or even institutional setting by focusing on police encounters with pedestrians. I conclude with some general remarks about developing a curriculum theory of the welfare state.
Curriculum theory and civic development
The relegation of most of our society's intellectual and material investment in the civic curriculum of a single public institution -the school -is a recent phenomenon. Mass, state-supported schooling began in the 19 th century with the emergence of the (Jaeger, 1945, p. xiv) . Plato famously took up the problem of paideia in Republic, where he imagined the ways in which ideology, property law, social institutions, and political structures all created civic propensities (trans. 1992). Among Enlightenment philosophers, Montesquieu (trans. 1777) argued that laws themselves make citizens, because people learn civic habits and beliefs from their daily experiences and interactions. In a republic in particular, law must nurture virtue and the legitimacy of the state, he maintained, because only upon the people's restraint of their short-sighted self-interest could it survive (p. 260). In viewing crime and punishment, for example, Montesquieu warned legislators against excessive punishment of offenders because of the civic lessons it would impart to all citizens. «When the abuse is redressed, you see only the severity of the legislator», he explained, «yet there remains an evil in the state that has sprung from this severity; the minds of the people are corrupted, and become habituated to despotism» (p. 535). By the time nation states arose across the Atlantic world in the mid 19 th century, the notion of republican institutions had taken hold. The Second Great Awakening and market revolution re-energized Enlightenment-era enthusiasm for a virtuous, educated citizenry in the United States. White Americans organized common schools, penitentiaries, and asylums as custodial institutions designed not merely to impart formal knowledge, to mete punishments to the body, or to warehouse deviants and the poor, but to affect inward change in their charges' individual habits, attitudes, and beliefs (Katz, 1968; Rothman, 2002) . Among these institutions the common school alone emerged over the course of the 19 th century as America's primary public institution. Basic services -police, fire, professional government bureaucracies -were neither professional nor well-regulated until the end of the century (Wiebe, 1967) .
At that point, where progressive reformers entered the story and invented the specialized field of curriculum theory, the common school had become a nation-wide, free, formal, coeducational institution offering mass education at unprecedented rates. Capped by the comprehensive high school, the public school system that emerged by the end of the progressive reform era was the quintessential American public institution: providing food for hungry children, medical examinations, vaccinations, IQ testing, career counseling, workforce development, and even training in areas traditionally reserved for the family, such as home economics, sex education, and «life adjustment» (Reese, 2005; Tyack, 1974) . No wonder theorists framed the school as the single most important public institution for the incubation of future citizens.
Ideas about how states should form citizens, whether in Bobbit's day, in Montesquieu's, or in our own, have been hotly contested and inconclusive. My purpose here is to develop a mainstream and inclusive conception of curriculum theory in the early 21 st century. This conception, I argue, is currently rooted in schooling, but can form a framework for reclaiming the state itself as a unit of analysis. At its most basic level, the word curriculum comes from the Latin for «racetrack», and commonly denotes the series discrete learning experiences that together comprise a body of learning. Importantly, the use of the term curriculum implies a set of experiences that is not natural, but planned, coherent, and progressive. The racecourse designers and participants expect that, in the process of running the racetrack, the runner will improve in some way. In mass, public schooling, this improvement is politically framed, contested, and contradictory. For example, in policy talk the curriculum is expected to provide individual opportunity and serve the greater good; produce more competitive workers and more cooperative citizens; teach critical thinking and obedient patriotism.
Theorists carve the curriculum in different ways. Some view it in terms of three «levels» in relation to the organizational structure of schools. The top level -which exists in the discourse of public and official policy -is referred to as the planned curriculum. At the level of the classroom, what the teacher actually does is called the enacted curriculum. What the students walk away with from running the course constitutes the learned curriculum (Marsh, 2009) . Other theorists view curriculum in an experiential sense, as «complicated conversation» that gives form to knowledgeable identity formation within a set of organized relations to power -a conversation that can reify or disrupt oppressive norms of gender, sex, race, class, etc. (e.g. Pinar, 2012 Pinar, , 2006 . In a different, more common conception, the curriculum exists in «forms», framed in relation to positive aims. The explicit or overt curriculum refers to the official and intended body of learning. The implicit curriculum includes the body of learning inherent in the experience of running the course, including a hidden curriculum that is antithetical to the stated aims of the overt. Finally, there is a null curriculum -that which is, significantly, not taught (Eisner, 2002) . This latter formulation is more useful for distinguishing conscious versus unconscious social production regardless of the particular organizational or institutional characteristics of curriculum-containing phenomena. This essay will employ the overt, implicit/hidden, and null conceptions.
The overt curriculum describes what is formally offered, officially sanctioned, and/or described in standards, curriculum guides, and lesson plans. The overt is what's supposed to be offered, by someone with authority. Given the complexity of organizations, however, the overt curriculum that a teacher enacts in the classroom is unlikely to correspond exactly with what the state standards recommend, what the principal demands, what textbook suggests, or what the day's lesson plan aspires to achieve. Nevertheless, what the teacher is explicitly trying to impart in relation to the officially sanctioned body of learning would still be considered the overt curriculum.
The implicit curriculum, which is imparted in the daily experience of the overt, includes a body of secondary or unintended learning experiences. For example, sitting in bolted down rows of desks in front of a lecturing teacher on a daily basis carries with it an implicit but ancillary set of lessons about the nature of knowledge (fixed), and of the learning process (passive and atomized). Immanuel Kant celebrated the implicit curriculum of schooling. «Children… are first sent to school, not so much with the object of their learning something, but rather that they may become used to sitting still and doing exactly as they are told» (Kant, trans. 1900) .
A hidden form of implicit curriculum would be one where the egalitarian goals of opportunity and democracy in the overt curriculum are undermined in the daily grind of schooling. A course on American history that includes not a single image or mention of an African American person, except as a slave or a criminal, would send children a subtle message about the role and capacity of black identity in American life. The routines of institutional behavior, allocation of punishments and rewards, as well as pedagogical practices can also constitute a hidden curriculum (Jackson, 1968; Skiba, Mediratta, & Rausch, 2016) . In her classic study on the «hidden curriculum of work», Jean Anyon (1980) found that while teaching and learning the same overt curriculum, five fifth grade classrooms across New Jersey contained glaringly differentiated «hidden» curricula that corresponded to the socioeconomic character of their local communities. Working class classrooms focused on following procedures and obeying rules; middle class classrooms emphasized getting the right answer and presenting it clearly. An affluent professional community's classrooms, in contrast, emphasized working independently and creatively, while an executive elite community's fifth graders learned to reason through problems, conceptualize rules, and find places to exceed stated expectations. Yet all these classrooms shared the same stated curriculum. Implicit bias, stereotype threat, cultural relevance or irrelevance, and other factors can all contribute to hidden curricula (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Steele, 2010; Tatum, 2003) .
The null curriculum, first proposed by Eisner (1985) , refers that which is not in the curriculum. It includes «the options students are not afforded, the perspectives they may never know about, much less be able to use, the concepts and skills that are not part of their intellectual repertoire» (Eisner, 1985, p. 107) . Obviously the infinite body of quotidian knowledge and skills is not important. Rather, it is the conspicuously or significantly absent things that deserve attention. In terms of distribution of opportunity, for example, the null curriculum would include the absence of AP courses for the poor. In terms of the political purposes of the curriculum, the absence of human evolution in the biology classroom would signal a religious bias. Likewise, in terms of intellectual processes, scholars of civic education (including Bobbit) have long decried the absence of training in problemsolving and active participation as a serious lacuna in the American curriculum, one that Anyon found to be unevenly distributed by social class. Critical theories such as feminism, critical race, queer, and Marxist, as well as positivistic theories of human development or economic theories of distribution or social psychological theories of intergroup relations each afford lenses through which to view conspicuous absences in the curriculum.
Finally, curriculum historians in particular have noted that curriculum theory does not emerge sui generis. Major shifts in institutional organization and practices in schools have led, at different points, to new ideas about what the content of schooling is for and can do. So have major shifts in American society, leading to policy talk that elevates previous ideas to new highs, or enervates previous curricular movements with little appreciation for their effectiveness at meliorating old concerns (Kliebard, 2002; Tyack & Cuban, 1995) . Thus theories of curriculum both emerge from and also contribute to the organizational structures educational institutions. This final point is important in consideration of how curriculum theory might move beyond the schoolhouse walls to provide us with a wider lens with which to analyze the ways in which the welfare state makes its citizens. 
Socialization, policy feedback, and the sociology of place
Curriculum theory is not the only, or best, way to understand the relationship between public institutions and civic development, of course. Outside of the field of education, there are rich areas of social science inquiry into the ways in which people learn and experience civic identity. In this essay, I consider three such areas: socialization, policy feedback, and urban sociology. Generally speaking, socialization theory springs from psychology and uses the person, or persons, as the unit of analysis. Policy feedback looks at the ways in which social policy shapes the political preferences and behaviors of citizens. Urban sociology, by contrast, focuses on the social consequences of lived experience in socially constructed spaces. Rarely do these social science conceptions of civic learning outside of schools deploy notions of curriculum, however, focusing instead on the effects of institutional experience or «contact» on individuals and groups, on the political consequences of policy making, or on the salience of place, rather than the contours of learning experiences in relation to publicly acknowledged aims.
Socialization is a vast, interdisciplinary field of inquiry that examines the process by which human beings acquire the skills for participating in society. The primary unit of analysis of socialization is the person (or persons). Methodologically, socialization studies are inductive, searching for correlations of particular variables and reasoning up to theories of causality. Among the many approaches to understanding the developmental process of personhood, a few stand out in their emphasis on a person's civic identity. These include related but distinct areas of study: moral, legal, and political socialization.
In their recent overview of the field, Killen and Smetana (2015, p. 702 ) define moral socialization as the processes by which people learn to treat others, as well as the ways in which they organize their thinking about their intentions and motivations in doing so. In the former case (the process of moral formation), scholars consider a variety of educational theories, such as constructivism, behaviorism, and social learning theory, and cognitive development, as well as theories of an innate human morality rooted in evolutionary biology. In the latter case scholars consider the structure of the moral norms themselves, framing moral development in terms of emotions (such as empathy or obligation), deontological moral judgments, identity formation, and even neurological hard-wiring, among other conceptions (Doris & Cushman, 2010; Killen & Smetana, 2014; Killen & Smetana, 2015, pp. 702-708) .
Studies of moral development are sensitive to social contexts, chief among them family, as well as peer group and other situations involving close interpersonal relations. Importantly, however, the study of moral socialization focuses primarily on the effects of particular qualities of intimate human interactions within these contexts, and not phenomenological studies of the contexts themselves. The person remains the unit of analysis. For example, one of the key ideas to emerge in the field recently is social domain theory: exploring the ways in which children can develop domain-specific notions of good behavior and distinguish these with ones that carry across domains, as well as ones that advance their personal interest at any given time. From a young age, individuals balance these three domains of reason-making: the societal (concerning the contextual norms of their situation), moral (concerning Espacio, Tiempo y Educación, v. 4, n. 2, julio-diciembre / july-december 2017, pp. 19-42.
e-ISSN: 1698-7802 universal notions of right and wrong), and psychological (concerning personal goals and sense of identity). In addition to challenging long-standing notions of stadial moral development (Kohlberg, 1984) , an important implication of this work for social policy is that it suggests that the overt or socially ascribed characteristics of particular learning context matter less than we might think for developing morality (Killen & Smetana, 2015, pp. 707-708) . Good behavior in school, for example, may not be understood by the child as being a good person. In general, the inner workings and processes of the human mind, and the ways in which interpersonal relationships offer a series of learning opportunities for moral development are the province of moral socialization. The constructedness, interrelation, coherence, and social meaning of these opportunities are not the focus of study.
As with moral socialization, the study of legal socialization concerns developmental and epistemic features of one's social identity. In this case, legal socialization concerns the ways by which, and in which, people come to understand their relationship to the law. Legal socialization is distinct from moral socialization in that it concerns how we think authorities should impose behavioral standards on people generally, as opposed to considering our personal notions of right and wrong action (Tyler & Trinkner, 2017) . Law abidingness is a concern of civic identity; so too, are the notions of state legitimacy that grow out of one's relationship to and understanding of the law (Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Jackson, 2013) .
Studies of legal socialization are similar to moral socialization in other respects. They have traditionally grown from two distinct theories of learning -cognitive developmental theory that looks at inherent, stadial views of human cognitive function, and social learning theory, which looks at the role of environment. And they are rooted in inductive research traditions that examine discrete environmental correlations. According to Cohn and White (1990) , researchers in the field have typically asked questions about behavioral response to rules in three ways: vertical transfer (do behavioral responses carry up and down levels of authority?), horizontal variation across situations and cultures, and longitudinally over the developmental life-course of the individual (Cohn & White, 1990) .
Given the keen interest of legal scholars and criminologists in why people obey the law, it should not be surprising that much of the institution-specific attention to legal socialization has examined interactions with legal authorities -police, courts, and carceral institutions (Fagan & Tyler, 2005) . In their recent review of the field, Tyler and Trinkner note that there has been relatively little scholarly attention in the last two decades to families and schools as sites of legal socialization, though from a developmental perspective such sites are critical for children and adolescents (Tyler & Trinkner, 2017) . Nevertheless, as with moral socialization, studies of legal socialization do not typically concern themselves with understanding the nature and range of learning opportunities within or among institutions. Forthcoming work by Tyler and Tricknor (2017) , which uses a developmental approach across families and schools over the early life course, offers a promising and nuanced step toward a study in implicit curriculum, though it does not draw upon curriculum theory as such.
Political socialization is the field of socialization research most directly concerned with civic identity development. Despite a major decline in the field since the 1980s, there remain important questions, and research projects, engaging the 1 Political socialization refers to the ways in which people develop their political identities. As with other studies of socialization, it includes interest in the frames into which individuals organize political meaning conceptually as well as the processes by which they create meaning (Torney-Purta, 1990) . It draws on traditions of cognitive development and capacity as well as developmental theory (Ganzach, 2017; Ra & Bourdeaux, 1977) . Scholars of the latter tradition point to many sources of political learning in addition to schools: families, workplaces, military service, participation in movements and in volunteer groups, religious organizations, and, increasingly, in the consumption of mass media (De Landtsheer, Farnen & German, 2014; Ichilov, 1990; Putnam, 2000; Sigel, 1989; Stacey, 1978; Thorson, McKinney & Shah, 2016) . Importantly, political socialization studies focus a good deal on macro-as well as micro-level processes of political identity formation, include a variety of methodological traditions and fields, and have rich connections with educational research. Indeed, the decline of the traditional field of political socialization could be indicative of a renaissance of inquiry by other names (Sherrod, Torney-Purta, & Flanagan, 2010b) . If such a renaissance is indeed the case, however, generalizations about political socialization as a field of inquiry may be tenuous.
Instead, it is useful to look at an example of recent studies growing out of political science that examine the civic effects of a particular social phenomenon: mass incarceration. The term mass incarceration describes the explosive growth in rates of people kept in prisons and jails that began in the 1980s and has resulted in the United States having the highest rates of incarceration in the world, ever. In their book Arresting Citizenship, Lerman and Weaver (2014) use two national data sets to explore the civic outcomes of mass incarceration, which, they find, exerts withering, anti-democratic effects with disproportionate consequences for individuals and communities of color. Significantly, Lerman and Weaver describe the effects as a form of «civic education» -a research phrase rarely used in contexts outside of schooling. More typical is the language in Guetzkow and Western's (2007) synthesis, «The Political Consequences of Mass Imprisonment», which describes «effects» in terms of heartbreaking outcomes for the incarcerated and their communities (as well as for the political culture of the broader society). In neither case, however, do these and other studies link what they are seeing with systematic exploration into the educational qualities of the experiences that create many of these effects (Braman, 2007; Guetzkow & Western, 2007; Wildeman, 2010) .
Not all approaches are inductive or centered on the individual. Political scientists offer another (related) theory for understanding the macro effects of social policy on American civic life: policy feedback. Andrea Louise Campbell describes this phenomenon simply as «how policy makes citizens» (Campbell, 2003) . Policy feedback provides a useful framework for understanding the distinctions between the civic aims and effects of social policy, insofar as policies have effects that shape future political demands for certain types of policies. These Jacobs (2007) argues that in the history of American universal healthcare, the incremental approach of building from one trusted program (Social Security) to establish Medicare succeeded. But that framing produced an electorate unwilling to associate the benefit with other types of populations. (Notably the Obama Administration's successful passage of the Affordable Care Act, several years after Jacobs's analysis, did not rely on the medicare-outward model.) On the other hand, Soss & Schram (2007) argue that federal welfare reform in the 1990s was part of a deliberate strategy by the Democratic Party to build support for anti-poverty welfare programs by diffusing white racial resentment of supposed African American welfare fraud. In this instance, the strategy did distance welfare from the Democratic party image, but did not yield significant political gains. In both instances, policy had a secondary effect of shaping the attitudes of voters toward future policy.
Because it examines the gap between stated and implicit intentions of state policy, the idea of policy feedback offers a promising approach to understanding the ways in which architects of the welfare state seek to shape people's ideas on a symbolic and political level, so that a policy's stated aim (and effects) on public behavior might be understood as a form of instruction. Policy feedback could fit under the umbrella of «public pedagogy», although its origins are not in critical cultural analysis but in political science. Its methods are deductive, which conduces broad, critical examinations of policy inputs. With its emphasis on policy and politics, however, policy feedback does not draw on developmental theories per se, and tends to concern the political beliefs and attitudes of adults, since the «feedback» mechanism is typically defined in terms of voter support for future policy. Feedback's consequences for children in, say, the reception of welfare assistance, health care, or public housing, are managed by adults and then redistributed. Sociological studies of children's life trajectories as a result of social policy in such areas as social mobility, educational attainment, or contact with the criminal justice system, are not typically framed in terms of policy feedback loops.
The sociological study of neighborhood or (more generally) place in the formation of civic identity has yielded another rich body of knowledge on civic identity formation, insofar as neighborhoods do not exist naturally, but reflect federal, state, and local policy. Such studies de-center any one particular institution, but instead cut across numerous institutions, events, and other social factors and structures -from nuclear to extended families and networks, to participation in school, church, gang, and workplace, to singularly powerful experiences with local events -a protest, a wedding, or an assault by police. They ask questions about the role of individual choices and social structures, and interrogate the role of place itself in social reproduction. While the project of urban sociology has, primarily, been to understand the interrelations of race, inequality, and crime, such categories are, in themselves, important markers of civic status, perception, and behavior.
The recent work of quantitative sociologist Rob Sampson is exemplary. In Great American City, Sampson (2012) and his team consider an astonishing breadth of variables in order to measure «neighborhood effects» on lived experience. Data sources included seven-year longitudinal cohort studies of over seven thousand children and families and surveys of some eleven thousand others; videotaped social observation studies of twenty thousand street segments; interviews and panel studies with thousands of community leaders, a study of some four thousand collective action events over a thirty-year period, archival and census research on a host of demographic data, and more. Among several key questions, he asks, «What neighborhood factors best predict the civic health and well-being of citizens? How do individual choices combine to create social contexts that then constrain choices? In short, what are the social pathways by which neighborhood effects are transmitted in the contemporary city?» (pp. 583-585). Sampson's methodology is an expression of the inductive research approach par excellence, offering a rich and well theorized accounting of the workings and salience of neighborhood in human development and, of equal importance, human development in the maintenance and transformation of place. Indeed, his research grows out of the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods, and reflects his interests in crime in the life course and civic engagement (Sampson & Laub, 1993; Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, 1998) . While its focus on place imposes obvious contraints, Sampson's work may be the closest study we have to a modern research inquiry into the ancient Greek concept of paedeia.
This latter point is important because none of these frames from social science -socialization, policy feedback, or urban/place-based sociology, is entirely exclusive of the others. Indeed, Sampson draws heavily on socialization theory, political science, and moral philosophy to make sense of his massive data sets. Different traditions employ different units and modes of analysis, even as they cluster around the same fundamental question: how does the state contribute to and shape the experiences and identities of those who live in it? (Implicit in most of this work are normative assumptions that certain kinds of outcomes -ones consistent with a liberal democracy -are desirable.) Social science research tends to look at outcomes, seeking correlations with and (ideally) causes for particular measurable social factssocial and political survey answers, demographic and economic data, and individual indicators of psychosocial health.
Curriculum analysts, by contrast, look at inputs. They seek to understand the barrage of formal and informal experiences that institutions and social policies expose participants to on a daily basis. They critique the qualities of these learning experiences based on theories of society and the presumed (or measured) consonance of particular elements with that vision. They are concerned with design.
There are, of course, educational psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists who bring their methods and theories to bear on schools and schooling, including what is taught and why. My purpose here is not to engage in the Herculean task of parsing that research to show the ways in which curriculum theory can learn from other theories related to civic identity formation within the school context. Instead, I wish to think outward from the school toward other contexts. What does it look like to take what we know from studying education in schools and apply it to the education that occurs elsewhere? In particular, how can curriculum theory, the study of what institutions teach and why, contribute to understanding what happens in contexts where it rarely (if ever) joins other ways of thinking about civic identity formation?
The criminal justice system offers one such case study.
Stop, Question, and Frisk: a case study in civic curriculum
Outside of public schools, the criminal justice system comprises one of the most pervasive sets of institutions, policies, and interfaces between citizens and the state. The system is not really systematic, but is more like a patchwork that includes local, state, and federal agencies for law enforcement, adjudication, and incarceration. In the 2012/2013 fiscal year Americans spent 265 billion dollars on criminal justice, about 43% of the 620 billion they spent on public schools (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2012; National Center for Education Statistics, 2016). Most formal public encounters with the system are with police: a Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) survey estimated that 17% of Americans over the age of 16 had a face-toface encounter with a police officer in 2008, most frequently in relation to a traffic stop. Of these, 90% reported that the officer acted appropriately (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011). In terms of incarceration and supervision -that part of the system that is supposed to be minimal because it imposes extreme costs -Americans have far too much contact. At the end of 2015, for example, about 1 in 37 adults in America was under some form of correctional supervision (incarceration, probation, parole) (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2016). A 2003 BJS report suggested that one in nine male residents in America born in 2001 was statistically on track to go to prison at some point in his lifetime (and 1 in 56 women). Such rates dwarf those of other democracies, and even this country two generations ago, by an order of magnitude (International Centre for Prison Studies, n.d.). Finally, Americans encounter the system in municipal, state, and federal courts.
Like the public school system, the criminal justice system distributes points of contact and outcomes in ways that are deeply unequal, racially disproportionate, and profoundly linked to the future life course. In terms of police encounters, most people who directly encounter the criminal justice system do so early in their lives, during adolescence and early adulthood (Tyler & Trinkner, 2017, p. 5) . For many Americans, primary or secondary contact with incarceration is a regular part of life. Among the cohort of African-American men born in 1979, for example, those who did not graduate from high school had a 68% chance of being incarcerated at some point in their lives. Such a high concentration of incarceration on particular populations has had devastating effects on whole communities (Coates, n.d.; Pettit & Western, 2004) . Overall, one in nine African American children today has had a parent in prison (Paquette, 2015) . And finally, like the public education system, the criminal justice system is a site of great political significance, where present and aspiring politicians placate their political bases by playing to disparate notions of fairness, retribution, and mercy.
What does it mean to think of the criminal justice system as having curriculum of civic education? Since carceral institutions are similar to schools in many respects, it does not require a large conceptual leap to theorize overt, implicit, and hidden curricula (as well as a conspicuosly absent one) in the operation of jails and prisons. Instead, I turn to the police.
Police are framed in many ways -guardians, warriors, street-corner politicians and psychiatrists. Rarely, however, are they understood to be civic educators. Indeed, for most of the 20 th century, they were not even understood to play a role in
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e-ISSN: 1698-7802 reducing crime. Dominant theories of police work emphasized catching criminals ex post facto, so that the certainty of punishment would deter criminals and, importantly, give victims a sense of justice. Crime was understood primarily in economic termsas a criminal weighing the costs and benefits of breaking the law. In the 1990s, however, police forces around the country began to adopt a «broken windows» form of policing that drew on social science research into the role of perceptions of social order and disorder in criminal behavior. Police could actually prevent crime, according to this theory, by aggressively monitoring and prosecuting low-level criminal behavior (Meares, 2015) . While broken windows had a theory of crime, however, it did not have a theory of education. In particular, it did not consider the ways in which systematic police encounters may, in themselves, shape human civic development. The case of New York City's widespread use of stop, question, and frisk (SQF) as part of Operation Impact in 2001 offers a case study in policing as a social policy for crime reduction that lacks a theory of education. The case is a good example in several ways. Policing is deeply textured and contextual work. Rarely, if ever, have city police departments engaged in policing as proactive social policy on such a massive scale. The case is now subject of a substantial and growing body of research on the socializing effects of its primary instrument, SQF, although there is still much to be learned (Meares, 2014) . Finally, the case is timely, too, as President Trump has called for nationwide adoption of SQF despite its systematic application in New York City being found unconstitutional in federal court (Jackman, 2016) .
Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Ray Kelley launched Operation Impact in 2001, with the goal of reducing crime including, specifically, getting guns and drugs off the streets. The centerpiece of the strategy was the targeted application of SQF to high crime neighborhoods, so that police would blanket certain areas and engage large numbers of pedestrians. Despite its association with the Bloomberg administration of New York City, the policing practice known as SQF is longstanding. Often referred to as the «Terry stop», this action is governed by the Supreme Court decision in Terry v. Ohio (1968) in which the Court ruled that police could use a standard of individualized reasonable suspicion short of probable cause to detain, question, and pat down a pedestrian. Such a standard meant that the officer had to show that she had reasonable suspicion that the person being searched had just committed, or was about to commit, a crime. It also meant, however, that an officer could not engage in a full search of someone beyond a pat-down, nor could the questioning be a full interrogation (Meares, 2014) . While police in New York City and other jurisdictions had already employed the Terry stop for decades, Bloomberg and Kelley turned it into a form of social policy, linking demographic data and large scale application to what was traditionally understood to be an individually-based policing strategy. Reported Terry stops grew from 97,296 in 2002 to a peak of 685,724 in 2011 (MacDonald, Fagan & Geller, 2016 New York City Bar Association, 2013) . In 2013 a US District Judge ruled that the city had to change its policies -the first of several court rulings and an about-face in city policy with the election of Mayor DeBlasio. According to the New York ACLU, by 2015 the city reported only 22,565 Terry stops (NYCLU, nd). There has been a growing movement among social scientists to understand policing and civic experience, but very little that approaches it from an explicitly educational viewpoint (Weaver & Soss, 2017) . What set of lessons did Operation Impact offer New York City residents? While its policy architects did not speak as if SQF offered an education in what it means to be a citizen, those directly and indirectly affected can discern overt, implicit, hidden, and null curricula in its operations.
The overt curriculum can be found in the legal construction and stated aims of the policy. When police engage individual citizens in SQF, they are reinforcing the constitutional rights and privileges of all Americans to be safe, to be treated equally with regard to race, and to have due process. Police must give reasons for intruding on a person's privacy, and are constrained in their pat-downs and questions, which are supposed to fall short of a full search or an interrogation. Moreover, according to the stated aims of Operation Impact, the vast expansion of SQF in high crime neighborhoods was supposed to send residents the message that their city police cared about their well being and safety. Politically, SQF validates authoritarian political orientations toward justice: that minor violations of the personal liberty and physical bodies of people in high crime areas are acceptable costs for their own protection from crime (Saunders, Kelly, Cohen & Guarino, 2016) . As a systematic policy, SQF delivered a lesson in the legitimacy of the state to those of an authoritarian political orientation, showing that the mayor would be tough on criminals. For police unions in particular, SQF was popular (Gardiner, 2014) .
Supporters of SQF also noted two theories of crime reduction rooted in assumptions about responses to implicit conditions, although these bore no developmental component and were not framed in educational theory. The first was old-fashioned deterrence, a theory consistent with an authoritarian political perspective. The likelihood of being stopped, questioned, and frisked, they argued, meant that fewer people carried guns and contraband on their persons (Weisburd, Wooditch, Weisburd & Yang, 2016) . Second, according to broken windows theory, community perceptions of increased social order would also increase law abidingness (Meares, 2015; Tyler, Goff & MacCoun, 2015) . In neither case, however, did the theory have an accounting for learning and development. Was crime reduction the result of lessons learned, or just temporary responses to conditions?
In practice, however, Operation Impact offered another set of lessons that undermined its overt goals of responsive government and civic well-being, as well as its assumptions about implicit learning. In its daily grind, SQF offered a hidden curriculum of white supremacy. The police disproportionately targeted people of color, and treated them with disproportionate severity if they were arrested (Fagan, 2010, pp. 3-4) . Moreover, given the massive expansion of SQF, what was imagined by the Supreme Court in Terry to be a matter between police and suspect individuals acquired a group aspect. In high crime areas, one study found, 80% of young black men between the ages of 18 and 24 were stopped at least once in a single year (Meares, 2014, p. 339) . Instead of offering valid reasons for their stops, a study of four million SQF reports found, police listed «furtive movement» as the sole justification for detaining, questioning, and patting people down in half of all stops -hardly the constitutional standard the Supreme Court imagined in Terry (Fagan, 2010, pp. 41-60 to deviate significantly from the stated purpose of getting guns and drugs off the street and reducing crime: a 2010 study found that NYPD officers recovered guns in only 0.15% of encounters, and contraband in 1.75%. These rates were no better than searches done at random, despite a supposed constitutional threshold of reasonable suspicion (Fagan, 2010, p. 4; Jones-Brown, Gill & Trone, 2010 ). And on an individual level, SQF is never without cost. Consider the potential for shame during a public interrogation and pat down -or equally bad -the ways in which such actions can offer a badge of belonging and resistance to police. In both instances, the goal of reducing crime potentially comes at the cost civic humiliation and alienation (Colb, 1996) . On the other hand, notably absent in SQF, its null curriculum, was any systematic attempt to acknowledge or meliorate the potentially negative lessons it offered in practice, including internal data monitoring for implicit bias, constitutional violations, or negative effects in perception. In short, SQF sent very clear messages to whole communities, and in particular to young men of color, that they did not possess the same constitutional rights as other citizens, that they were inherently suspect, that they were not deserving of dignity and respect, and that police regard them as a problem (Justice & Meares, 2014) .
What does a consideration of police work as curriculum work achieve? Contact with police can provide a powerful set of signals about one's civic standing (Tyler, Fagan & Geller, 2014) . Indeed, near the end of the Obama Administration, the President's Task Force on 21 st Century Policing offered just such an observation, although curriculum theory itself was not included as a framework. Rather than conceive of policing solely as the delivery of justice after crime, or as authoritarian order-maintenance among people of color who are poor, the task force recommended that police adopt procedures that enhance citizen/state relationship. Taking a page from Montesquieu, the report declared of police work, «Building trust and nurturing legitimacy on both sides of the police/citizen divide is the foundational principle underlying the nature of relations between law enforcement agencies and the communities they serve» (President's Task Force, 2015) . Considering that police contact is, for some people and some communities, so frequent as to be routine, and further, that any one encounter can be a high-stakes and life-changing event, police interactions with the public matter a great deal in substance as a site of civic instruction.
Moreover, considering police contact as part of a broader set of learning experiences across a given persons or community's interactions with state-sponsored institutions and actors opens up a much wider window into how people experience and develop a sense of civic identity. How can educational researchers understand a student's experience of the (mandatory) school civics curriculum when he or she also experiences a (mandatory) SQF after school? From a socialization perspective, the effects of these two experiences are worth (and are being) investigated. From a policy perspective, however, thinking in terms of curriculum may help criminal justice leaders, as well as rank-and-file workers, understand how to better design, train for, and implement police procedure, being attentive to the gap between policy intentions and policy implementation in ways that enhance the strength of our democracy. Awareness of the civic curriculum of children's lives outside of schools also matters for teachers who engage with them in civic sense-making in classrooms. 
Conclusion: toward an intermural curriculum of the welfare state
In her classic study Ghetto Schooling, Jean Anyon offers the gloomy, if apt analogy: «Trying to fix an urban school without fixing the neighborhood is like trying to clean the air on one side of a screen door» (Anyon, 1997, p. 168) . Without addressing the social context in which schools operate, the comparison suggests, policy makers are unlikely to affect real change in how schools perform. So it is with civic education. Scholarship on civic formation from numerous domains and derived in numerous institutional and non-institutional settings shows that people residing in the United States develop their sense of civic self in ways that do not recognize the walls of the classroom as much more than screens. It is also clear that the social conditions of American civic life are wrought by many forces -from the global flow of wealth, health, ideas, and people, to local decisions driven by choice and social structure -that make such ecologies difficult to nurture. Many of these conditions are beyond our control, or at least, beyond the reach of ordinary policy.
But there is also much within our control. Understanding public institutions and policies as sites of civic education offers a modest set of potentialities for strengthening American democracy. Once we recognize the educational implications of social policy, we can benefit from deploying curriculum theory to understand, critique, and ultimately improve them. Making such a move, however, requires researchers and policy makers alike to broaden their notions of curriculum.
For the most part, educational researchers today hold fast to the notion of the curriculum as being the province of schools, while discussion of education outside of schools is rare within social science research. «Political socialization», writes a prominent curriculum theorist uncontroversially, is «the largely unconscious activity of reproducing people who embody the dominant social norms, customs, beliefs, and institutions» (Parker, 2015, p. 7) . Schools, the reasoning goes, are uniquely positioned to offer a conscious disruption to social reproduction.
Perhaps. But considering the structure of civic life in the early twenty-first century, political socialization is hardly unconscious. It is characterized by consciously constructed experiences that serve explicit and implicit functions, as well as symbolic versus substantive ones, in every facet of life: from where people live, to what they eat, to how they structure their families, bear offspring, and die. There is, today, nothing natural or accidental about the ordering of everyday life in the United States of America -or, for that matter, anywhere. Educational researchers have a good deal to gain from scholars studying civic identity formation across all sectors of society, both because of those sectors' effects on what happens in schools and because such attention would reframe schools as but one part of a broad ecosystem of civic life.
On the other hand, psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists and others outside the field of education could benefit from a better understanding the rich theory and research on the ways in which civic learning inputs are created, rationalized, and emerge in multiple, simultaneous forms. Looking at socialization as a result of institutional exposure does not necessarily enable researchers to engage a nuanced inquiry into the distinctions between intentional and unintentional socialization -a difference between, say, the highly political symbolic language of Espacio, Tiempo y Educación, v. 4, n. 2, julio-diciembre / july-december 2017, pp. 19-42.
e-ISSN: social policy on the one hand and the lived experience of social policy in practice on the other. What urban sociology gains in its rich ecological analysis could be more effectively coordinated with the study of how systematic educational experiences emerge, by design or not, out of policy aspirations. The policy feedback loops identified by political scientists and the cultural ones described by critical theorists might be effectively integrated and critiqued as a corpus of civic inputs through which individuals and groups navigate the construction of their civic selves.
Can schools do things that other institutions cannot? Certainly. As Parker and others argue, school attendance in and of itself correlates with «enlightened political engagement», in part because schooling provides access to implicit factors -social networks and experiences that have causal relationships to democratic civic development-but also because schools, at the least, impart formal knowledge of democratic citizenship that people may then activate later (Nie, Junn & StehlikBarry, 1996; Parker, 2002, pp. 41-44) . In a society where young people receive civic messaging everywhere, schools can be indispensible for nurturing future generations in carefully orchestrated and purposeful encounters with democratic norms and values. But they are not alone.
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